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█ Abstract What is at stake in the debate between those, such as Sam Harris and me, who contend that we 
would lack free will on the supposition that we are causally determined agents, and those that defend the 
claim that we might then retain free will, such as Daniel Dennett? I agree with Dennett that on the suppo-
sition of causal determination there would be robust ways in which we could shape, control, and cause our 
actions. But I deny that on this supposition we would have the control in action required for us to basical-
ly deserve to be blamed, praised, punished or rewarded. In this response, I argue that this is the core issue 
that divides compatibilists and incompatiblists about free will and causal determination, and that the in-
compatibilist position is the right one to accept. 
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█ Riassunto Risposta a Daniel Dennett sullo scetticismo circa il libero arbitrio – Qual è la posta in gioco nel 
dibattito che vede contrapporsi chi – come Sam Harris e me – sostiene che non avremmo libertà di volere 
sulla scorta dell’ipotesi per cui siamo agenti causalmente determinati e chi, al contrario – come Daniel Den-
nett – difende l’idea che possa darsi un libero volere? Concordo con Dennett circa il fatto che, anche 
nell’ipotesi della determinazione causale, resterebbe lo spazio per sostenere che per vari e importanti aspetti 
saremmo comunque noi a modellare, controllare e causare le nostre azioni. E tuttavia rifiuto che su questa 
base avremmo il controllo in azioni richieste per meritare di essere biasimati, lodati, puniti o premiati. A mio 
avviso questo è l’elemento cardine che divide i compatibilisti dagli incompatibilisti all’interno del dibattito 
sul libero arbitro e sulla determinazione causale e ritengo che la posizione corretta sia quella incompatibista. 
PAROLE CHIAVE:  Sam Harris; Daniel Dennett; Scetticismo verso il libero arbitrio; Compatibilismo; Incompa-
tibilismo 
 

IN THE FREE WILL DEBATE, I’m classified, 
like Sam Harris, as a free will denier and an 
incompatibilist. But these classifications ob-
scure important distinctions. I’m in many re-
spects in agreement with Daniel Dennett’s 
position, and he self-identifies as a compati-
bilist. I agree, for example, that on the suppo-
sition of causal determination there are ro-
bust ways in which we shape, control, and 
cause our actions. The terminology in the 
free will debate is at times too coarse-
grained, and participants on occasion talk 
past each other as a result. But this problem 
can be avoided if we take care to be clear 
about what we mean. 
The terms “free will” and “moral respon-
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sibility” are used with different senses, and 
the type of free will or control required for 
moral responsibility given several of these 
senses is uncontroversially compatible with 
the causal determination of action by factors 
beyond our control. I take “free will” to refer 
to the strongest sort of control in action re-
quired for a core sense of moral responsibil-
ity.1 That sense of moral responsibility, the 
one at issue in the free will debate, is set apart 
by the notion of desert.2 For an agent to be 
morally responsible for an action in this sense 
is for it to be hers in such a way that she 
would deserve to be blamed if she under-
stood that it was morally wrong, and she 
would deserve to be praised if she under-
stood that it was morally exemplary. 
It may be that the desert at issue is basic 
in the sense that the agent would deserve to 
be blamed or praised just because she has 
performed the action, given an understand-
ing of its moral status, and not, for example, 
merely by virtue of consequentialist or con-
tractualist considerations. A belief that an 
agent is morally responsible in this sense at 
least typically accompanies expressions of re-
active attitudes such as moral resentment 
and indignation, and it is thus closely related 
to the notion of moral responsibility that P.F. 
Strawson invokes.3 But there are other senses 
of moral responsibility that are not at issue in 
the free will debate, and are not challenged 
by skeptical arguments about free will, and 
the legitimacy of some of them is an im-
portant feature of my position. 
Some philosophers identify themselves as 
compatibilists because they hold that some 
non-basic-desert notion of moral responsibil-
ity, often one they regard as sufficient for the 
moral life, is compatible with determinism.4 
But if “compatibilism” is defined so that such 
a position turns out to be compatibilist, vir-
tually everyone in the debate stands to be a 
compatibilist. Frank Jackson says:  
 
What compatibilist arguments show, or 
so it seems to me, is not that free action as 
understood by the folk is compatible with 
determinism, but that free action on a 
conception near enough to the folk’s to be 
regarded as a natural extension of it, and 
which does the theoretical job we folk 
give the concept of free action in adjudi-
cating questions of moral responsibility 
and punishment, and in governing our at-
titudes to the actions of those around us, 
is compatible with determinism.5  
 
Dennett specifies that his compatibilist 
notion of free will can «play all of the valua-
ble roles free will has been traditionally in-
voked to play».6 However, Stephen Morris 
argues that Dennett  
 
has defined the concepts of “free will” and 
“moral responsibility” in such a way as to 
eliminate any substantive difference be-
tween the “compatibilist” position he de-
fends and the hard determinist position 
that philosophers typically understand as 
being substantively different from com-
patibilism.7  
 
The same might be said for Jackson’s view, 
depending on the details. Given Jackson’s and 
Dennett’s characterizations, virtually everyone 
would qualify as a compatibilist. I’d be one, for 
example, and it’s likely that Sam Harris would 
be one as well. If this is the notion of compati-
bilism that those in the Chalmers and Bourget 
survey had in mind, it would be surprising that 
as many as 12% of those surveyed are in fact 
incompatibilist free will deniers.8 I’ve been 
working in this field for a quarter century, and 
no clear example comes to mind. 
 
█ Core disagreements with Dennett 
 
Let me now set out the issue on which 
Dennett and I differ, and my sense is that 
here Harris and I concur in disagreeing with 
him. The manipulation argument against 
compatibilism brings this disagreement to 
the fore. The core idea of the manipulation 
argument is that an action’s being produced 
by a deterministic process that traces back to 
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factors beyond an agent’s control, even when 
it satisfies all the conditions on moral respon-
sibility specified by the contending compati-
bilist theories, presents no less of a challenge 
to basic desert responsibility than does deter-
ministic manipulation by other agents. My 
multiple-case manipulation argument9 sets 
out several manipulation examples, the first of 
which features the most radical sort of manip-
ulation consistent with the proposed compat-
ibilist conditions. The subsequent cases are 
progressively more like a final example, which 
the compatibilist might envision to be ordi-
nary and realistic, in which the action is caus-
ally determined in a natural way. A challenge 
for the compatibilist is to point out a relevant 
and principled difference between any two ad-
jacent cases that would show why the agent 
might be morally responsible in the later ex-
ample but not in the earlier one.   
We don’t have to examine the entire ar-
gument to see where the disagreement with 
Dennett lies. The first manipulation case 
from my 2014 book will do. The situation 
features Plum, who murders White for rea-
sons of self-interest: 
 
Case 1: A team of neuroscientists has the 
ability to manipulate Plum’s neural states 
at any time by radio-like technology. In 
this particular case, they do so by pressing 
a button just before he begins to reason 
about his situation, which they know will 
produce in him a neural state that realizes 
a strongly egoistic reasoning process, 
which the neuroscientists know will de-
terministically result in his decision to kill 
White. Plum would not have killed White 
had the neuroscientists not intervened, 
since his reasoning would then not have 
been sufficiently egoistic to produce this 
decision. But at the same time, Plum’s ef-
fective first-order desire to kill White 
conforms to his second-order desires. In 
addition, his process of deliberation from 
which the decision results is reasons-
responsive; in particular, this type of pro-
cess would have resulted in Plum’s re-
fraining from deciding to kill White in 
certain situations in which his reasons 
were different. His reasoning is consistent 
with his character because it is frequently 
egoistic and sometimes strongly so. Still, it is 
not in general exclusively egoistic, because 
he sometimes successfully regulates his be-
havior by moral reasons, especially when 
the egoistic reasons are relatively weak. 
Plum is also not constrained to act as he 
does, for he does not act because of an irre-
sistible desire – the neuroscientists do not 
induce a desire of this sort.10 
 
Does Plum deserve to be blamed or pun-
ished for what he’s done? I don’t think so, and 
many others surveyed. If we asked whether 
Plum basically deserves to be blamed or pun-
ished, perhaps even more would agree with 
me. True, there are those who hold that Plum 
does deserve to be blamed and punished.11 But 
there’s plenty of opposition to this compatibil-
ist line of thought.  
Another question one might pose is: 
Could Plum have done otherwise given that 
the compatibilist conditions are met? We can 
all agree that he has the general sort of ability 
to do otherwise that Dennett spells out. He 
indeed does have the general ability to kill 
and to refrain from killing. But we can ask: 
could he have exercised his general ability to 
refrain from killing on this particular occa-
sion?12 And now a common answer may be 
“no.” Further, suppose that on this occasion 
he could not have exercised his general abil-
ity to refrain from killing. We can then ask: 
Does he deserve, or basically deserve, to be 
blamed or punished? Here again, a common 
answer might well be “no.” 
 
█  A notion of moral responsibility that’s 
good enough 
 
Our practice of holding each other morally 
responsible is complex. It involves a number 
of different aims, and a range of responses jus-
tified by those aims. In recent years a number 
of theorists have argued that this complexity 
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can be unified, that there is ultimately a single 
notion of moral responsibility that unifies the 
practice. I believe that a view of this sort mis-
represents the practice to at least some degree, 
and here my potential allies include Gary 
Watson, Dana Nelkin, and David Shoemak-
er.13 With them, I contend that a certain kind 
of pluralism about the practice is true. 
It’s mistaken to claim that the term “mor-
al responsibility” has a single sense. Instead, 
there are various senses of “moral responsi-
bility” corresponding to multiple aims and 
justifications, all of which are aspects of our 
general practice of holding morally responsi-
ble. Purely linguistically, this is credible. Of-
ten linguistic terms that have a long history 
of use have a number of senses. Even if a re-
ferring term with such a history originally 
had just one specific referent, over time it is 
apt to be applied to similar but different ref-
erents, acquiring different senses as a result. 
The terms “free will” and “moral responsibil-
ity” plausibly have this feature.  
It’s clear that the usual holding-accountable 
aspect of the practice features the notion of de-
sert. There may in addition be senses of moral 
responsibility that involve a non-basic variety 
of desert. Essentially forward-looking notions 
of holding agents deserving of blame and pun-
ishment have been defended on consequential-
ist or contractualist grounds.14 But there might 
be no such thing, and as, we’ve seen, the ma-
nipulation argument provides an indication 
that any notion of desert is incompatible with 
causal determination. On one type of revision-
ary account, our practice of holding agents 
morally responsible in a desert sense should be 
retained, not because we are in fact morally re-
sponsible in this sense, but because doing 
would have the best consequences relative to 
alternative practices. Dennett15 advocates a 
version of this position, as does Manuel Var-
gas.16 One question for Dennett and Vargas is 
whether, given their positions, what we call de-
served responses are really just negative or posi-
tive incentives. We might not ordinarily regard 
them merely as incentives, but on this view 
their justification is ultimately forward-looking, 
founded solely on the value of consequences 
that we expect to result. And if these responses 
are in fact just incentives, then it would seem 
that they are not also deserved. 
There are reasons to be skeptical of any 
notion of moral responsibility that involves 
desert even independently of any considera-
tions regarding free will. One worry for the 
basic desert sense is that for an agent to basi-
cally deserve a harmful response she must 
have a kind of free will that is unavailable to 
us, and the free will skeptic contends that this 
concern can’t be successfully countered.17 As 
noted, one might argue that some desert sense 
of moral responsibility can or should be re-
tained because doing so stands to bring about 
good results, but on this view what might ap-
pear to be deserved responses would seem to 
be mere incentives. Another worry is that for a 
number of contending general normative eth-
ical theories the notion of desert seems to 
have the role of an awkward supplement. Any 
place for desert in typical consequentialist 
views is uncomfortable, and despite Kant’s in-
vocation of desert in justifying criminal pun-
ishment,18 that appeal appears not to be justi-
fied by any formulation of the Categorical 
Imperative, which he held to be the supreme 
and comprehensive moral principle. A further 
issue is that negative desert, at least in its basic 
form, would seem to involve the idea of harm 
as an intrinsic good, which is dubious.  
Motivated by these concerns, I’ve pro-
posed a view that rejects all desert-involving 
senses of moral responsibility. The notion of 
moral responsibility, and blame in particular, 
that I develop and endorse19 is largely for-
ward-looking. Blame is, in its paradigm cases, 
a kind of calling to account, and is justified 
by these forward-looking elements: 
 
(1) The right of those wronged or threat-
ened by wrongdoing to protect them-
selves and to be protected from im-
moral behavior and its consequences. 
 
(2) The good of reconciliation with the 
wrongdoer. 
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(3) The good of the moral formation of 
the wrongdoer. 
 
Immoral actions are often harmful, and we 
have a right to protect ourselves and others 
from those who are disposed to behave harm-
fully. Immoral actions can also impair rela-
tionships, and we have a moral interest in un-
doing such impairment through reconcilia-
tion. And because we value morally good 
character and resulting action, we have a stake 
in the formation of moral character when it is 
beset by dispositions to misconduct.  
There is an account of praise that corre-
sponds to this conception of blame. Of the 
three goals of blaming, moral formation, pro-
tection, and reconciliation, the one most clear-
ly amenable to praise is moral formation. We 
praise an agent for a morally exemplary action 
to strengthen the disposition that produced it. 
This can have a protective function, since 
strengthening such dispositions has the effect 
of reducing the incidence of dangerous behav-
ior. Corresponding to reconciliation is the no-
tion of celebrating successes in a relationship. 
Praising an action has this celebratory func-
tion as well. 
What is morally distinctive about blaming 
given the rejection of desert? I propose that 
the notion of moral protest is the essence of 
blame in the sense I’m setting out.20 The inspi-
ration comes from Pamela Hieronymi, who 
argues that resentment is best understood as 
moral protest: «resentment protests a past ac-
tion that persists as a present threat».21 Re-
sentment is not a feature of the sense of blame 
I have in mind. But on Hieronymi’s account a 
key function of blaming someone is to protest 
a past action of his that persists as a present 
threat, and I accept, in the account of blame I 
endorse, that this is one of its core functions. 
Angela Smith’s recent theory of blame also 
features a notion of moral protest, this time as 
the essence of blame.22  
I endorse the following account: 
 
Moral Protest Account of Blame: For B 
to blame A is for B to issue a moral 
protest against A for what B represents 
(either truly or falsely) as A’s immoral 
conduct. 
 
The immoral conduct will typically be an 
immoral action, but there are examples in 
which the action considered separately from 
the reasons for which it’s performed is not 
wrong, but the reasons make the overall con-
duct wrong.23 At times blame is misplaced, 
since no immoral conduct has taken place, 
but the protest can still count as blame. This 
can happen when X believes Y to have acted 
badly but the belief is false, due perhaps to 
misinformation or improper consideration of 
evidence. This can also occur when Y does 
not believe that X acted badly but nonethe-
less represents X as having acted immorally, 
as in cases of politically motivated false accu-
sation. It’s often the case that blame func-
tions, as in Hieronymi’s account, as a moral 
protest of a past action that persists as a pre-
sent threat, and I agree that this is one highly 
important objective for blame. But not all 
blame has this point, as when we blame the 
dead, or blame someone who is alive but 
lacks a persisting disposition to act badly – 
someone, for instance, who has already un-
dergone moral reform. In such cases protest 
can yet have the function of explicitly noting 
immoral conduct as immoral, which might 
also have the aim of general moral improve-
ment. In the example of the already-
reformed wrongdoer, blame might still func-
tion as a step in the process of reconciliation. 
While this moral protest account captures 
much of blaming behavior, it is consistent 
with the revisionary view that desert presup-
positions, which are widespread, have no jus-
tified role in blaming, and that its legitimate 
aims are instead those I’ve set out.24 
 
█  A way to deal with criminal behavior 
that’s good enough 
 
We also don’t need the notion of desert 
for a justifiable and workable way to deal 
with criminal behavior. I argue25 that it is not 
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the practice of holding criminals responsible 
at all that’s undermined by scepticism about 
free will, but only the justification of criminal 
punishment that depends on desert. In par-
ticular, it’s the retributivist justification of 
punishment, according to which the punish-
ment of a criminal is justified on the ground 
that he deserves it just because he has know-
ingly committed a serious offense, that would 
be undermined. By contrast with retributiv-
ism, justifying punishment on the ground of 
general deterrence does not seem to conflict 
with the denial of free will as the control in 
action required for desert responsibility. I 
agree that punishment can be justified on the 
ground of general deterrence as long as the 
punishment is not so severe that it undercuts 
a reasonable level of flourishing. Otherwise, 
the concern is that the person is being used as 
mere means to the safety of others. In my 
view it’s the right to life, liberty, and physical 
security of the person that has the key role in 
the use objection to general deterrence. 
There is a heavily weighted presumption 
against punishment as use, where that in-
volves intentional killing, confining, or inflic-
tion of severe physical or psychological harm. 
However, consider monetary fines, when they 
don’t hinder survival or the living at a reason-
able level of flourishing. I’ve argued that the 
general deterrence involving monetary fines 
may be in the clear.26 It’s plausible that the 
same can hold for short prison terms.27 
But what about dangerous crime that is 
not deterred by monetary fines or short pris-
on sentences? I’ve developed the view28 that 
there is a justification for prevention of dan-
gerous crime that is neither undercut by free 
will skepticism nor by other moral considera-
tions. This theory is based on the right to self 
defense and defense of others, and draws an 
analogy between treatment of dangerous 
criminals and treatment of carriers of dan-
gerous diseases. Those infected with such dis-
eases are not responsible in this (or in any) 
sense for the danger they pose, but we general-
ly agree that it is sometimes justifiable to 
quarantine them nevertheless. But then, even 
if a dangerous criminal is not morally respon-
sible for his crimes in the basic desert sense, it 
would be as legitimate to preventatively de-
tain him as to quarantine the non-responsible 
carrier of a serious communicable disease. 
Threats of less dangerous crimes would justify 
only milder forms of incapacitation than pre-
ventative detention, for the reason that the 
right of self-defense and defense of others jus-
tifies only the minimum harm that protection 
requires. I contend that the resulting account 
demands a degree of concern for the rehabili-
tation and flourishing of the criminal that 
would alter much of current practice. For just 
as fairness counsels that we attempt to cure 
the diseased we quarantine, so fairness would 
recommend that we try to rehabilitate the 
criminals we detain or otherwise incapacitate. 
Thus despite the many similarities be-
tween Dennett’s view and mine, there is a key 
difference. I deny that causal determination 
is compatible with the control in action re-
quired for moral responsibility in any desert 
sense, and in the basic desert sense in par-
ticular. I believe that this is no small matter, 
since relinquishing desert would stand to sig-
nificantly alter our practice of holding re-
sponsible and our ways of dealing with crim-
inal behavior. 
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